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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs. 
JESUS A. SEPULVEDA, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case no, 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal concerning the ruling denying the defendants 
Motion to Suppress by the Fourth Judicial District Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF 
APPELLANT REVIEW 
The issues on appeal are: first, was the length of the 
detention of the defendant by the officer justifiable by probable 
cause? Second, did the fact that the defendant was acting in a 
supposedly "nervous" manner give the officer enough probable cause 
to search the defendants vehicle? Third, did the defendant give 
the officer consent to search voluntarily, when the defendant does 
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not fluently speak english and was detained illegally prior to the 
search? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS/ STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional/ statutory/ or rule 
provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issues presented on 
appeal is contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Jesus A. Sepulvedaf was traveling northbound on I-
15 near Nephi, Utah. The defendant was stopped by Officer Paul 
Mangelson, of the Utah Highway Patrol/ and subsequently arrested 
for possession of illegal drugs* 
The defendant made a Motion to suppress the drug evidence on 
the basis that it was illegally obtained. This motion was denied 
by the Fourth Judicial District Court. Mr. Sepulveda was then 
tried and sentenced to serve time. The defendant now appeals his 
sentence on the arguments presented in this brief. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant, while traveling on 1-15 near Nephi/ Utah/ on 
January 30/ 1990f was stopped by officer Paul Mangelsonf of the 
Utah Highway Patrol. The vehicle driven by the defendant was in 
all respectsf being operated in an appropriate and legal manner, 
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however the vehicle registration was good only through the month 
of December, 1989. The expired registration was the reason given 
by the officer for the stop. Officer Mangelson also testified that 
the defendant did meet a drug courier profile. (T 14f26) The 
record shows that the defendant speaks Spanish as his primary 
language and can understand a "little" English and had to rely for 
communication upon a passenger during the initial stop and a 
translator during the trial. (T 45) After the initial inquiry 
about drivers license, registration and destination, defendant was 
directed to exit the vehicle. 
The officer also noticed that the defendant was visibly shaking, 
and he attributed this nervous behavior to the defendant's wrongdo-
ing. (T 33) This observation, the loose drug profile, and disturbed 
paint on the screw head which secured the back seat lead Officer 
Mangelson to believe that the defendant was transporting drugs. 
The Officer then began to search the vehicle on the basis that the 
defendant gave a consent to search. The defendant denies that he 
was asked for, or gave permission, to search or look into the 
vehicle. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The defendant was justifiably stopped by Officer Mangelson for 
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expired registration. However, the defendant was detained and his 
vehicle was searched, all without probable cause. The officer can 
only articulate that the defendant was visibly shaken, and the 
paint on the screws holding the seat was disturbed. These facts 
alone could not make a reasonable person conclude that a crime was 
being committed or about to be committed. Based on these facts 
the defendant's Constitutional rights were violated and the 
evidence obtained from the illegal search, should have been 
suppressed in the original trial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DETENTION OF THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT JUSTIFIED BY PROBABLE CAUSE 
Both the United States Constitution and the Constitution of 
Utah protect individuals against illegal searches and seizures. 
Constitution of Utah Article I, Section 14 
"The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not 
be violated;" 
The defendant asserts that his rights under article I, section 
14 of the Utah Constitution were violated, due to the fact that the 
officer did not have any reasonable suspicion to detain him or 
subsequently search his vehicle and himself. In State v. Leonard 
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173 Utah Adv. Rep. 50, the court refers to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 
1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968), saying: 
The Terry Court held that a police officer must be able 
to Point to "specific and articulable facts which, taken 
together with rational inference from those facts, 
reasonably warrant that intrusion." 
The reasonable suspicion standard is stated in Utah Code Ann, 
section 77-7-15 (1990) : 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place 
when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has 
committed or is in the act of committing or attempting 
to commit a public offense and may demand his name, 
address and an explanation of his actions. 
In this case, there is no evidence that would lead the 
reasonable person to conclude that the defendant is committing or 
about to commit a crime, except the fact that the defendant had 
expired registration and fit the drug courier profile. A reasonab-
le person could not possibly justify a search of an individual and 
an individuals vehicle on those points themselves. 
In a very helpful case dealing with the search and seizure of 
an individual the Utah Court of Appeals found that the individual 
was detained without reasonable and articulable suspicion. State 
v. Carter 156 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (1991) the court found that 
the failure of defendant to produce identification, the officers 
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perception of line at defendants waist, and pat down observations 
made by officers was not sufficient to constitute a reasonable 
suspicion either alone or in the aggregate. In the present case 
the defendant was only driving an unregistered car, and responded 
nervously, as do most people, upon being approached by an officer. 
There was no evidence of drug use and no smell of marijuana or any 
other contraband. And no evidence of any other crime. Thus the 
facts presented should allow the defendant to suppress the evidence 
found in his illegal search. 
POINT II 
THE OFFICERS RELIANCE ON THE DEFENDANTS NERVOUS BEHAVIOR WAS NOT 
PROBABLE CAUSE TO SEARCH THE DEFENDANT AND DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE 
When being pulled over by a peace officer it is a* very 
natural response for an ordinary citizen to be nervous. However, 
this fact could not lead an officer to believe that a crixne is 
being committed and therefore justify a search. If it were eyery, 
"nervous" individual would be suspected of committing a crime. In 
the case State v. Godina-Luna 179 Utah Adv. Rep 21,(1992) the court 
states; 
The fact that defendants were nervous does not raise a 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, nor does the 
fact that they were proceeding in a less than direct^ 
route to their destination. 
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In a similar case State v. Mendoza 748 P2d 181 (Utah 1987) the 
court held that the officers reliance on the defendants nervous 
behavior could have no weight in determining reasonable suspicion. 
In addition the Mendoza case refers to Brignoni-Ponce, 442 U.S. 
885,886 saying that several factors listed in the Brignoni-Ponce 
case are absent from the Mendoza case as they are in the present 
one. 
Defendants did not try to evade the officers, nor did 
they attempt to conceal anyone or anything when the 
officers began pursuing....nor was there any indication 
that the vehicle was heavily loaded. 
Due to the fact that the defendant was only shaking (acting 
nervous) there was no reason for the officer to detain the defen-
dant for the time that he did. This statement is reinforced in 
State v. Godina-Luna 179 Utah Adv. Rep. 21 (1992) , State v. Johnson 
805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991) where the court said, 
the length and scope of the detention must be strictly 
tied to and justified by the circumstance which rendered 
its initiation permissible. Once the reason for the 
initial stop have been satisfied, the individual must be 
allowed to proceed on his or her way. 
Based on the illegal detention, and lack of probable cause, 
the motion to suppress evidence should have been granted. 
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POINT III 
THE DEFENDANT DID NOT GIVE THE OFFICER CONSENT TO SEARCH 
VOLUNTARILY AND WITHOUT PRIOR ILLEGALITY 
In State v. Carter 156 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (1991), the court 
sets forth a two-prong test which must be met for consent to 
search to be lawfully obtained. 
a two-prong test must be met for the evidence to be 
admissible: "(1) the consent must be voluntary in fact: 
and (2) the consent must not be obtain by police ex-
ploitation of prior illegality." 
It is the states burden to prove that this test was met in 
order to show that the consent of the defendant was legally 
obtained. The court records show that their was a language barrier 
between Officer Mangelson and Mr. Sepulveda, this is evidenced by 
the fact that there was the need of a translator through-out the 
entire trial. In Carter, the Court refers to Marshall 791 P.2d at 
887 to show the standard that must be met by the state to prove 
voluntary consent. One of these standards states; 
(1) There must be clear and positive testimony that the 
consent was "unequivocal and specific" and "freely and 
intelligently given"; 
In this case there is emphasis added to "intelligently given". 
How could Mr. Sepulveda have possibly given intelligent consent 
when he does not speak English and Mr. Mangelson does not speak 
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Spanish? 
Alsof the defendant contends that the illegal detention by the 
officers, lead to the search. In Carter it states, 
the defendant's consent was tainted by the prior illegal 
seizure as a matter of law and, therefore, that the 
contraband should have been suppressed. 
The state argued that the defendant voluntarily opened up the 
trunk of the car. This action could be attributed to the fact that 
the defendant was intimidated by the officer and felt he had no 
rights. In Godina-Luna a similar situation existed and the 
defendant Orozco invited the officer to search. 
The deputy's question which prompted Orozco1s invitation 
confirmed defendant's belief that because he was Mexican 
and did not have a drivers license, a search would be 
inevitable whether he consented or not. Therefore, we 
conclude that Orozco1s invitation to search was the 
result of the exploitation of his illegal detention. 
The state has failed to meet the two-prong test to show that 
the defendant gave consent voluntarily and without prior 
illegality. For this reason the court should hold the evidence 
obtained from the illegal search inadmissible. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, this court should reverse 
the decision made on the Motion to Suppress. 
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DATED this day of April, 1992, 
'MILTCfN T/ HARMON 
Attorney for the Defendant and 
Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — 
Issuance of warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause sup-
ported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be 
seized. isoo 
UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop and 
question suspect — Grounds. 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public 
place when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe 
he has committed or is in the act of committing or is 
attempting to commit a public offense and may de-
mand his name, address and an explanation of his 
actions. 1B80 
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